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Abstract 
This analysis explores the feasibility of sorting UK funds into three different styles, which are 
widely used in the US. In an overview of major factors’ impact on the expected risk of a fund, 
the analysis shows that leverage is by far the most influential factor, followed by the subtype 
diversification. In a preliminary style-classification, the study uses Loan-to-Value ratio (LTV) as 
the dominant factor, defining funds with no debt as core, funds with LTV lower than 40% as 
value-added, and funds with higher than 50% LTV ratios as opportunistic. Then the study makes 
some adjustments to this classification based on the observation of the funds’ attributes other 
than LTV, and the adjusted classification ends up with 19 core funds, 22 value-added funds and 
21 opportunistic funds. After that, three major differences between the UK and US funds are 
found. First, the core approach represents a smaller portion of the UK funds than the US funds 
and the opposite is true for the value-added approach. To improve the feasibility of researchers 
comparing funds within these two countries, the thesis suggests using a fourth style, core-plus. 
Second, the average LTV for core and value-added approaches is much lower in the UK than in 
the US. Third, the US opportunistic funds seem to have better performance than their UK 
counterparts with similar leverage ratio, while future studies would help draw more precise 
conclusions about the performance comparisons.  
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
1.1 Background 
In today’s real estate investment world, the three styles of core, value-added and opportunistic 
are widely used in classifying real estate on both property and portfolio levels. Generally 
speaking, the core approach means holding highly-occupied properties of institutional subtypes1 
in domestic first-tier metropolitan areas, with very little leverage. The value-added approach 
involves more redevelopment and leasing to add more value to properties than the core approach, 
and also more leverage and some exposure to non-institutional subtypes2. The opportunistic 
approach, with the highest leverage ratio among the three, generally involves development, the 
holding of distressed properties, overseas investment, and land speculation. Besides these three 
styles, a fourth one called core-plus is also used by investors to refer to the approach between 
core and value-added. However, in most white papers and documents, core-plus is not listed 
officially as the other three yet.  
Among these styles, opportunistic is the more recent one, emerging no earlier than the beginning 
of the 1990’s, but ever since then it has gained an increasing share of new investment activities 
in the US. Figure 1-2 shows its growth from the early 1990’s to the early 2000’s. By the end of 
2008, despite a huge loss during the financial crisis, opportunistic funds still represented more 
                                                 
1 In the US, Institutional subtypes include office, retail, industrial and multi-family housing. 
2 Non-institutional subtypes include but are not restricted to Hotels, Golf courses, Prisons and Hospitals.  
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than one third of all the US funds in terms of Net Asset Value (NAV), as is shown in Figure 1-1. 
At the same time, the core approach remains the cornerstone, representing the largest share 
among all funds.  
Figure 1-1 Distribution of US funds among three styles, 1Q/2009 
 
Source: NCREIF & the Townsend Group 
 
Figure 1-2 Opportunistic funds equity commitments vs. NCREIF property index ($Mn) 
 
Source: Pension Consulting Alliance, Inc. 
The categorization of funds is useful to investors in several ways: first, it provides a rough but 
useful description of the expected risk and return for each fund. Such a description helps buyers 
choose proper funds to fit their investment purposes. In addition, it improves the transparency of 
9 
real estate markets, and helps fund managers market their products, because a lack of symmetric 
information contributes to under-pricing. Based on Rock (1986) study, a discount is required to 
entice uninformed buyers to join informed buyers in IPO offerings3.  
Furthermore, the classification of styles also provides a benchmark for each group to measure 
managers’ performance, making “apples-to-apples” comparison possible. The classification of 
three (or four) styles also enables better due diligence through the tracking of style drift, and 
facilitate the creation of new indices. 4 
In the UK, the styles of core, core-plus, value-added and opportunistic are often used in 
classification and fund-performance comparison. However, an official classification doesn’t 
appear either in the real estate indices or in the documents of most funds. Instead, the 
conventional ways of classification for UK property funds are:  
a) Balanced or Specialist. Balanced funds generally hold a wide mix of property assets, 
diversified both by subtype and sub region, while Specialist funds normally focus on specific 
subtypes or on properties within particular geographic regions. 
 
 
                                                 
3 Kevin Rock, why new issues are underpriced, Journal of Finance Economics, 15-1986 
4 NCREIF Styles White Paper Committee, Real Estate Investment Styles: Trends from the Catwalk, Oct 2, 2003 
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Figure 1-3 Composition of UK funds 
62 UK funds 
Net Assets 
20561.6Mn Pounds
All balanced
54%
Specialist
46%
 
62 UK funds 
Net Assets 
20561.6 Mn Pounds
CIF
EPUT
ICVC
LP
MPF
PNP
PUT
 
 
b) PUT or LP or ICVC5 or MPF6, etc. These are abbreviations for funds’ management types. For 
example, A PUT is a collective investment scheme where the underlying properties are held on 
trust for the participants. A Limited Partnership (LP) has at least one general partner, who has 
unlimited liability while the other partners’ liabilities are limited to the extent of their capital 
invested in the partnership.  
Balanced funds are less volatile while specialist funds try to get higher than market return by 
exploiting their expertise pursuing special opportunities. However, this classification doesn’t 
                                                 
5 An Investment Company with Variable Capital (ICVC) is an open-ended collective investment scheme structured 
as a corporation. 
6 A Managed Property Fund (MPF) is similar to an Exempt PUT in operating effectively free of tax, in being 
unitized and being open-ended. However, unlike PUTs, they do not distribute their income and are managed mainly 
by insurance companies as vehicles for investment by their occupational pension fund clients.  
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have a high correlation with the expected risk/return that the US-three style-definition displays. 
Therefore, applying the US-three style-definition to the UK funds, and translating the 
conventional classifications into a generally accepted standard will be necessary and meaningful.  
1.2 Literature review 
• Style-classification for real estate investment 
The definitions of the three styles have different versions, but a systematic and quantitative one 
has hardly been put forward yet. A description by NCREIF and the Townsend Group is: “Core 
funds typically utilize low leverage and invest domestically in stabilized assets, whereas 
Opportunistic funds typically utilize high leverage, take on more market risk, and may invest 
domestically and/or internationally. Value-added generally falls somewhere between the two.”7  
The definition raised by Ron Kaiser8 (2005) covers more factors such as property subtype and 
the size of value: “‘Core’ has traditionally involved investments in generally fully leased, multi-
tenant properties more than $5 million in size, in major metropolitan areas, owned with little or 
no mortgage debt. ‘Value-added’ approaches generally involve relatively substantial 
redevelopment or releasing of a property to increase its potential value at a rate in excess of 
general market trends. ‘Opportunistic’ originally involved the purchase of distressed properties at 
rock-bottom prices and their redevelopment, but has evolved to other aggressive forms of 
                                                 
7 NCREIF and the Townsend Group, Real Estate Fund Indices and Vintage Period Performance Report, Q1/2009 
8 Ronald W. Kaiser, Director and Co-founder of Bailard Investing. 
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investing such as new property development and heavily leveraged property ownership.”9  
Within the same paper, Kaiser mentions that “some consultants use absolute targets: ‘core 8-
10%, core-plus 10-12%, value-added 12-14%, and opportunistic 14%’; and others use a relative 
yardstick: NPI+100, NPI+200 and NPI+500 basis points.” 
INREV (An European Association for Investors in Non-listed Real Estate Vehicles)  has also 
developed a set of descriptive definitions, which covers more factors, including proportion of 
income-return and diversification among markets and property types. 
Table 1-1 Definitions of styles by INREV 
Core A fund which invests predominantly in mature sectors and countries. The fund will use low 
leverage, have no or very low development exposure and generate a high proportion of return 
through income. It will be well diversified through large holdings of assets and/or countries. 
Value-added A fund which may invest in any country or property type and deliver returns from a balance of 
income return and capital appreciation. The fund may allocate all of investments to less mature 
markets or alternative sectors, development or other forms of active management, such as 
active leasing risk, and moderate leverage. Return will come through adding value to the 
property through active asset management such as a reletting, refurbishing and redevelopment. 
Opportunistic A fund which typically uses high leverage, has a high exposure to development or other forms 
of active asset management, and will deliver returns primarily in the form of capital 
appreciation. The fund may invest in any markets or sectors, and may be highly focused on 
individual markets or property types. 
Source: INREV, Real Estate Fund Style Framework, Jan, 2009 
 
To figure out how people make the US-three style-classification in their own ways, both the 
NCREIF Styles White Paper Committee (2003) and Ron Kaiser (2005) surveyed some 
investors/managers, and they both got divergent results. For example, to answer what “the 
maximum leverage ratio of core approach” is, one respondent in NCREIF’s survey suggested 
                                                 
9 Ronald W. Kaiser, Investment Styles and Style Bosex in Equity Real Estate: Can the Emerging Model Succeed in 
Classifying Real Estate Alternatives? Journal of Real Estate Portfolio Management, Jan-Apr 2005. 
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30% while the other one suggested 70%. In Kaiser’s survey, the answers range from “non to 
little”, 30% to 50%. For “the leverage ratio of value-added”, people in Kaiser’s survey give 
answers ranging from “max 50” to “up to 100%”.  
The NCREIF Styles White Paper Committee (2003) name eleven attributes including leverage 
ratio, regional distribution and so on, to define styles; but a further development of the definition 
in REIS, which was supposed to be published the following year, was absent. Ron Kaiser (2005) 
raised ten factors, which are similar to those eleven attributes, to be used in the US-three style-
classification (See Tables 2-2,2-3,2-4).  
• Real estate fund performance in the UK and the US 
McGreal, Adair and Webb (2009) construct sixteen mean-variance optimal portfolios of private 
real estate from the UK and the US from 1Q/1986 to 3Q/2007. Three subtypes, office, retail and 
industrial, are included. The research shows that the high risk portfolios using total returns are 
100% UK. For all three subtypes and when the three subtypes are combined, offices never enter 
the optimal portfolio for either the US or the UK. In the optimal portfolios combining three types 
and both income-only and appreciation-only returns in both countries, income-only retail from 
the UK is the best choice for the low risk portfolio; Income-only industrial from the US is the 
best choice for the medium risk portfolio; and income-only industrial from the UK is the best and 
only choice for the high risk one. To some extent, this explains why core funds, focusing on 
14 
stabilized assets with high income return, have relatively higher Sharpe ratio in both countries 
for the past five years10.  
Table 1-2 US and UK retail, office, and industrial: income vs. appreciation (quarterly) 
 
Source: Journal of real estate portfolio management. Jan-Mar, 2005, p92 
 
 
• Diversification of real estate portfolios 
In the survey by Louargand (1992), 125 fund advisors and sponsors responded about the criteria 
for diversification in their portfolios.  As is shown in Table 1-2 and 1-3, the majority of the 
respondents rely on property types first and location second. The size factor also has a high 
citation rate, although it is not considered as among the top two criteria.     
Table 1-3 Explicit diversification criteria in equity portfolios (percent affirmative choice for each criteria) 
 “Do you use any of the following as explicit criteria for diversification in 
your equity Real estate portfolio?” 
Property type 89% Property age 17% 
Property size 50% Region 72% 
State 22% Metropolitan area 39% 
Submarket 26% Economic location 41% 
Tenant type or business 34% Lease terms 32% 
Fixed allocation by category 5% other 13% 
No systematic diversification criteria 8%   
Source: Journal of Real Estate Research, Vol. 7. Fall 1992, p365 
                                                 
10 See the Sharpe ratios for UK and US funds in Appendix A and B. 
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Table 1-4 Ranking of diversification criteria for equity portfolios (frequency of ranking) 
 “Please rank your top five criteria for diversification in your real estate portfolio 
 (1= Most important, 5=Least important) 
Criteria ranking 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 
Property type 54 22 9 5 0 
Region 12 32 14 3 3 
Economic location 13 17 21 10 6 
Metropolitan area 7 11 11 7 5 
Submarket 1 6 6 6 5 
Tenant 1 5 11 17 11 
Lease terms 2 3 8 9 14 
Age 1 3 3 8 7 
Size 0 12 16 14 11 
other 8 1 2 1 3 
Source: Journal of Real Estate Research, Vol. 7. Fall 1992, p366 
 
From the Real Estate Fund Indices and Vintage Period Performance Report, first quarter 2009 
(the NCREIF& Townsend Report) by NCREIF and the Townsend Group, we see that in the US, 
only opportunistic funds have real estate investments in regions other than the Americas.  
In the White Paper “Real estate opportunistic funds: Déjà Vu all over again” by Pension 
Consulting Alliance, Inc., over one hundred opportunistic funds are surveyed about their 
diversification by sub regions and subtypes. In total, 92% of their investments are allocated in 
North America and Western Europe. Including Japan, the mature market represents more than 
95% of all investments.  
In terms of subtypes, Office, Hotel, Apartment and Retail are the top four largest categories, 
amounting to about 58% of total assets. Industrial, which is considered as an institutional 
subtype, represents only 3 percent of the total asset value of opportunistic funds. 
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Figure 1-4 Opportunistic funds’ diversification by geography, as of 2001 
 
Source: Pension Consulting Alliance, Inc. 
 
 
 
Figure 1-5 Opportunistic funds’ diversification by sectors, as of 2001 
 
 
Source: Pension Consulting Alliance, Inc. 
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• Property size 
Ziering and McIntosh (1999) investigate a number of real estate properties and find that property 
size is positively correlated with risk-return levels across a relatively broad continuum. They 
divide 2,332 properties into four size categories: <$20m, $20m-$40m, $40m-$100m, >$100m. 
Based on the data from 1981 to 1998, trophy properties (larger than $100m) show higher 
volatility both in their values and incomes.  
Figure 1-6 Relationship between property size and risk-return profile (1991-1998) 
 
Source: Journal of Real Estate Portfolio Management. 
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1.3 Data  
• UK funds 
The data on UK funds used in this analysis is provided by Investment Property Databank11 
(IPD), a globally famed company in real estate performance analysis. The IPD data set covers 62 
UK property funds, all of which are investing in the UK’s domestic market. The following 
attributes are provided for the 62 UK funds: 
* Fund types: Balanced/ Specialist funds, PUT/ICVC/LP funds, Closed/Open-ended funds. 
* Balance sheet information: Gross Asset Value (GAV), Net Asset Value (NAV), Debt, Gearing 
on GAV12, Gearing on NAV, Net debt13. 
* Distribution: Distribution among sub regions and subtypes. 
* Diversification: Concentration on the Top 10 investments or tenants, average Lot-size. 
* Investment restrictions: Maximum exposure to development, maximum cash holdings, and 
maximum lot-size14, etc. 
* Performance: quarterly and annually fund-level return since as early as  year 1990.  
* Other attributes: e.g. taxes, fees, restrictions, total units.  
                                                 
11 http://www.ipd.com/ 
12 Debt divided by GAV. It is the same measure and Loan-to-value ratio. 
13 Net Debt (ND) =All borrowings less any cash balances held 
14 Lot-size is the market value of a property. 
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In terms of timeliness, the data for GAV, NAV, Debt, Cash holding, fund type, distribution, 
performance is updated to 1Q/2009, and data for other attributes are up to 3Q/2008. 
•US funds 
In the absence of fund-level data, we use the NCREIF& Townsend Report as the source of data 
on the US funds.15 Over 300 funds are included in the fund pool, although fund-level data is not 
available. By calculating attributes and performance of the UK funds in a similar way as the 
NCREIF& Townsend Report (See Appendix A), some comparative studies between the UK and 
US funds are possible.  
The following data are provided in the NCREIF& Townsend Report: 
* Demographic attributes of the three styles including total NAV /GAV, market share, fund 
count and manager count. 
* Periodic returns for different length of history for three styles (calculated by value /equal 
weighted, open/closed end, and net/gross of fee). 
* Sharpe ratio, volatility for three styles (calculated by value /equal weighted, open/closed end). 
* Leverage ratio for three styles (calculated by value /equal weighted, open/closed end). 
* Vintage period performance, etc. 
 
                                                 
15 Part of the report is shown in appendix B. 
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1.4 Methodology 
This thesis explores a quantitative and practical way to sort property funds into the three styles, 
with the knowledge that UK and US funds have different characteristics. The focus and main 
difficulty of the study is to find the attributes between the funds’ attributes and the expected 
risk/return. Both quantitative and qualitative methods are utilized. Following the classification 
we conduct some comparative studies between the UK and the US funds sorted according to the 
same styles. 
First, we go over several factors suggested to be used in the US-three-style classification, 
including Loan-to-value ratio (LTV), Net Asset Value (NAV) and property size. Four 
regressions are conducted to determine the factors’ impact on volatility. We expect to see 
significant differences among these factors’ relevance to the volatility from the regression. 
Second, we begin the classification by using a dominant factor, LTV. The classification process 
should be iterative. After a series of observations of the relationship between each factor and 
LTV, some outliers are identified and a few funds are re-classified. Finally, a comparison 
between UK and US funds shows the advantages and disadvantages of utilizing this US-three-
style classification to UK funds.  
21 
Chapter 2:  Overview of Relevant Factors 
2.1 General definition of core, value-added and opportunistic styles  
The definition of styles in the real estate investment world is far from clear or commonly 
accepted. A general description appears in the NCREIF& Townsend Report: “Core funds 
typically utilize low leverage and invest domestically in stabilized assets, whereas opportunistic 
funds typically utilize high leverage, take on more market risk, and may invest domestically 
and/or internationally. Value-added generally falls somewhere between the two.” 16 At times, 
investors use absolute return targets to help define the difference among investment styles, with 
core returning 8-10%, core-plus delivering 10-12%, value-added providing up to 12-14%, and 
opportunistic investments yielding higher than 14%. A relative yardstick is also often used for 
the three styles, such as the NCREIF Property Index return plus 100, 200 or 400 basis points.17   
The ultimate criteria to determine a fund’s style should be the expected risk and return, a point 
about which most investors agree. A common way to estimate the risk/return of an investment 
vehicle is looking at its historical performance, but this shortcut is not practical for property 
funds because investors need to know the risk/return especially when a fund has just been 
founded. So investors need to examine some inherent factors to make the estimation. In practice, 
                                                 
16 NCREIF & the Townsend Group, Real Estate Fund Indices and Vintage Period Performance Report, First Quarter 
2009, July 2009 
17 Ron Kaiser, Investment Styles and Style Boxes in Equity Real Estate: Can the Emerging Model Succeed in 
Classifying Real Estate Alternatives?, Journal of Real Estate Portfolio Management, 2005 
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this classification work is not done in a very objective and quantitative way. According to the 
NCREIF& Townsend Report, funds in the US are classified into style indices based on two 
factors: 1) the style classification the manager uses when marketing the fund; 2) the assessment 
that Townsend and NCREIF personnel make upon the “overall goals, objectives, and strategies” 
18of the funds.  During the second stage of classification, the personnel review many factors, 
including “investment discretion, various layers of portfolio and investment level risks, and 
limited performance history,”18 and the process can be “somewhat subjective.” 18Sometimes the 
Townsend and NCREIF do have different opinions about a fund’s style from those of the fund 
managers.  
If we call the stock classification-method factor-oriented, then the real estate classification 
method is indeed return-oriented. 19 In the stock market, before tracing the return of each group, 
people sort securities according to quantitative factors such as size and Book-to-Market ratio. In 
contrast, the classification of core, value-added and opportunistic starts from the expected return. 
Being return-oriented generates some inherent difficulty in the classification of real estate 
investments, since the relationship between a factor such as property size and the expected return 
is difficult to recognize and calculate.  
 
                                                 
18 NCREIF & the Townsend Group, Real Estate Fund Indices and Vintage Period Performance Report, First Quarter 
2009, July 2009. 
19 Ron Kaiser (2005) pointed out that styles in security market and real estate market are classified in different 
directions. In the stock market, stocks are classified using factors like size and Book-to-Market ratio and then 
examined for their performances, while in real estate markets assets are pooled based on their expected performance. 
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2.2 Factors used in defining styles 
Apart from the expected return, which is the most common and explicit way to classify styles, 
both the NCREIF Styles White Paper Committee (2003) and Ron Kaiser (2005) suggest a list of 
other factors to use in the classification. With the two lists combined, there are 17 different 
factors in total. These factors can be divided into three categories: finance, property and 
operating.  
• Financial factors 
There are three financial factors: leverage, non-real estate assets and fund size. Leverage is 
perhaps the most important factor due to its significant and direct influence on the expected risk 
and return. The biggest non-real estate asset in property funds is cash. Cash (or other equivalent 
risk-free assets) generates no return, so holding cash will simply lower both a fund’s risk and 
return. In theory a fund should hold cash as little as possible to maximize the total return, unless 
it face pressures of redemption or it has transactions to make. In Figure 2-1, we see that most 
closed-ended funds have less than 5% of their total assets in cash.  
Figure 2-1 Cash holdings and term structures among 62 UK funds 
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Fund size is another important financial attribute of property funds. Generally, larger funds 
(funds with larger asset value and more properties) tend to have lower risks, because they are 
better at avoiding idiosyncratic risks (they achieve better diversification) than smaller funds. 
Thus, for core funds whose partial task is to duplicate the general market return, a large size is 
very favorable, or even necessary. For opportunistic funds, whose objective is to focus on special 
opportunities, a small equity size with more debts will be a better choice. As is shown in Table 2-
1, in the US, the average gross size of core funds is about five times that of the other two styles. 
At least in the US, size can be a key factor to distinguish core funds from the other styles.  
However, diversification can be a double-edged sword for large core funds when it is 
unconstrained.  Unrestricted diversification can also add more risk. For example, bringing hotel 
or prison assets into a portfolio makes it less core and more opportunistic.    
Table 2-1 Sizes of three styles in the US, 1Q/2009 
 Core Value-added Opportunistic 
NAV 66004 29128 62147 
GAV 94269 68572 205103 
Fund Count 21 80 212 
Average Size (NAV) 3143.0 364.1 293.1 
Average Size (GAV) 4489.0 857.2 967.5 
 
Table 2-2 Financial factors 
 By NCREIF By Ron Kaiser Correlation with risk 
1 Permitted and Actual Leverage  Degree of Leverage Strongly Positive  
2 Percentage of  non-real estate 
assets 
- negative 
3 Composite Size (Total Asset 
Value) and Number of Investments 
- negative 
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• Property factors 
Property factors include property size, property type, location and the stage of development, etc. 
About property size, there are two different opinions about its relationship with the volatility. 
Traditionally, most investors define larger properties as institutional assets, which are less risky, 
because large properties normally target high-quality tenants and long-term leases. However, the 
study by Ziering and McIntosh (1999) shows that large “trophy” properties are more volatile 
than smaller properties, and produce 200 bps higher returns. 
Another property factor is property type, or subtype. In the US, the four major types of Office, 
Multi-family housing, Retail and Industrial are traditionally considered as core subtypes. The 
Hotel, although included in the NCREIF Property Index (NPI), is not supposed to be a core 
subtype, and it makes the NPI different from a Core Index20.  
In the UK, however, residential properties are not considered institutional due to reasons of the 
social mindset and land use restrictions. First, the "property ladder" is very desirable in the 
country, and the percentage of residential ownership is much higher than in the US. Second, it is 
relatively more difficult to conduct large-scale residential projects, which are preferred by 
institutional investors. 
Property location has several different levels ranging from country, region, state and 
metropolitan area, down through submarket. On the country level, the domestic market is 
                                                 
20 NCREIF Styles White Paper Committee, Real Estate Investment Styles: Trends from the Catwalk, Oct 2, 2003. 
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considered less risky than international markets, at least from the perspective of an investor from 
mature markets such as the US, UK, or Japan. In the US, only opportunistic funds are allocating 
their capital globally21. On the regional level, the first-tier metropolitan areas, such as the top 
thirty MSAs in the US22, are often considered to be institutional or core.  
Additionally, a diversified portfolio among core subtypes or core regions is even less risky. 
According to a survey by Louargand (1992), subtype and location are the two most important 
criteria in real estate diversification. Regressions in Section 2.3 will show the impact of subtype 
diversification on a fund’s volatility. Furthermore, Chapter 3 makes more observations about the 
dispersion of specialist funds among three style boxes.  
Early stages of real estate lifespan have significantly higher risks than the holding of a stabilized, 
fully-occupied property, because the earlier the stage is, the more likely something unexpected 
could happen. Normally, land speculation, entitlement and development belong to the 
opportunistic approach, while leasing and redevelopment belong to value-added.  
 
 
 
                                                 
21 Appendix B, page 59. 
22 Ronald W. Kaiser, Investment Styles and Style Bosex in Equity Real Estate: Can the Emerging Model Succeed in 
Classifying Real Estate Alternatives? Journal of Real Estate Portfolio Management, Jan-Apr 2005. 
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Table 2-3 Property factors 
 By NCREIF By Ron Kaiser Correlation with risk 
4 - Property Size Not clear 
5 Distribution of Assets by Property 
Subtype  
Property Type Risk of diversification among core subtypes 
< Risk of one core subtype < Other subtypes 
6 Distribution of Assets by Sub 
region   
Property Location Risk of diversification among core regions < 
Risk of one core region < Other regions 
7 Distribution of Assets by Lifecycle  
(operating, redevelopment or 
others) 
Stage of Development 
 
 
Early stages are more risky 
8 - Property Quality level Negative correlation 
9 - Occupancy Level Negative correlation 
 
 
Table 2-4 Operating factors 
 By NCREIF By Ron Kaiser Correlation with risk 
10 Discretion - - 
11 Distribution of Assets by 
Investment Structure  
Degree of Ownership Control 
 
Direct ownership is less risky 
12 - Exit Strategy - 
13 Exposure by MSA – Top Ten with 
Exposure Percentage  
- - 
14  Exposure by Industry – Top Ten 
Tenants with Exposure (based 
upon revenue) Percentage  
- - 
15 Percentage Leased by Property 
Type (square feet or units) and 
Percentage Expiring by Year  
- - 
16 Schedule of Assets (non-
identifying) for each Portfolio 
included in the Composite.  
- - 
17  Targeted Strategies - 
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• Operating factors 
One important factor among this category is the ownership control. It is widely believed that 
direct holdings will reduce unexpected results for real estate investments. However, most factors 
in this category are hard to measure directly.  
 
• Rearranging the UK fund factors 
Besides the fund factors given in the IPD data set, I also rearrange some of them into new 
attributes, which are believed to have clearer quantitative relationship with the volatility. Table 
2-5 provides a list of all factors used in this study for the 62 UK funds.  
Factor 8, the Property Count Ratio (PCR) is a measure to represent the diversification among 
different properties, and it has a better linear relationship with the risk than factor 7, the Property 
Count. To demonstrate how diversified a fund is among different subtypes, an economics 
definition of Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)23 is borrowed. The HHI here represents how 
diversified a fund is among four categories: Office, Retail, Industrial and Other subtypes. 
 
 
                                                 
23 HHI is a measure of market concentration. It is calculated by squaring the market share of each firm competing in 
a market, and then summing the resulting numbers. HHI = s1^2 + s2^2 + s3^2 + ... + sn^2 (where sn is the market 
share of the ith firm). 
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Table 2-5 UK fund factors 
 Factors Formula Unit 
1 Loan-to-Value ratio 
(LTV) 
=Debt/ GAV   (%) 
2 Leverage ratio 
 (LR) 
=1/(1-LTV)  (%) 
3 Gearing ratio =Net Debt/NAV (%) 
4 Net debt =debt less any cash balance holdings  
5 Cash holding ratio =Cash/ NAV (%) 
6 Average lot-size  (£m) 
7 Property Count =GAV/ Average lot-size - 
8 Property Count Ratio 
(PCR) 
=1/ (property count)^0.5 - 
9 Subtype distribution =GAV in 3 major subtypes24/GAV (%) 
10 HHI by subtypes =HHI ratio of weight in 3 major subtypes and other 
subtypes25 
- 
11 Sub region distribution =GAV in South East/GAV (%) 
12 Net Asset Value  (£m) 
13 Direct holding ratio =GAV in Direct holdings/ GAV (%) 
14 Concentration on the top 10 properties =GAV of the biggest 10 properties/ GAV (%) 
15 Concentration on the top 10 tenants =Revenue from the top 10 tenants/ Revenue (%) 
16 Less than 10 yr expiring lease =Revenue from leases expiring in less than 10 years/ total 
revenue 
(%) 
17 Max. development exposure Regulated by the fund (%) 
18 Max. speculative Development 
exposure 
Regulated by the fund (%) 
19 Open/Closed-ended Regulated by the fund - 
20 Fund age - years 
 
                                                 
24 Based on the data set, three major subtypes include office, retail and industrial. 
25 HHI=(100×GAVoffice/GAV)^2+(100×GAVretail/GAV)^2+(100×GAVindustrial/GAV)^2+(100×GAVother types/GAV)^2. 
A fund focusing 100% on shopping centers has the HHI of 10000. For funds with cash holdings, The HHI can be 
lower than 2500, because the NAV in cash is not included in this formula. To some extent that makes the HHI more 
relevant here because cash generates no volatility. 
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2.3  Analysis of major factors’ impact on volatility 
A series of regressions is performed in order to see the impact of several factors on the volatility. 
The factors used in the regressions are selected because: 1) they are believed to be highly 
relevant; 2) they are likely to have linear relationship with the volatility; and 3) the data for these 
factors are available from the UK funds data set.  
For the first step, we conduct a regression of the volatility of funds’ annual returns on the three 
most important attributes: leverage, size and the diversification among subtypes. Suppose the 
equation is: 
σ = a + b1×LR + b2×PCR + b3×HHI,                                            (Regression 1)       
where: 
 σ= volatility of a fund’s annual returns. 
 LR=1/ (1-LTV).   
 PCR=1/ (N)1/2=1/ (GAV/average lot-size)1/2 . 
 HHI = the HHI ratio of percentages among Office, Retail, Industrial and Other properties.  
 
 10 yrs’ performance, 25 samples  
 Coefficients t Stat 
Intercept 6.432871 8.112179 
LR 5.645482 7.048608 
PCR -1.63041 -0.27082 
HHI 0.000312 2.584518 
R square 0.853167  
Adjusted R Square 0.83219  
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 7 yrs’ performance, 33 samples  
 Coefficients t Stat 
Intercept 6.587835 5.114511 
LR 6.745736 6.387127 
PCR 9.745693 1.501467 
HHI 0.000298 1.489908 
R square 0.797363  
Adjusted R Square 0.7764  
 
We run the regression under two scenarios with either the past 7 years’ data or the past 10 years’. 
Thus, one scenario has a more reliable calculation for volatility while the other one has more 
samples. From the results shown above, we can see that LR definitely has a dominant influence 
on a fund’s risk. The PCR’s coefficient is negative under the first scenario and positive under the 
second one, so its relationship with risk is not clearly shown. For HHI we have a statistically 
significant result, showing that when HHI rises by its standard deviation26 , the volatility 
increases by about 1(%).  
For the next step, we introduce lot-size and several dummy variables for the funds’ subtype 
focus. The equation is: 
σ = a + b1×LR + b2×PCR +  b3×HHI +  b4×Lot-size + b5×Office + b6×Retail + b7×Industrial 
+ b8×Other-subtype,                                                     (Regression 2) 
where: 
 σ=volatility of a fund’s annual returns. 
 LR=1/ (1-LTV).   
                                                 
26 The standard deviation of HHI for the 25 samples is 3200, and the one for the 33 samples is 3394. 
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 PCR =1/ (N)1/2=1/(GAV/average lot-size)1/2 .   
 HHI = the HHI ratio of percentages among Office, Retail, Industrial and Other properties. 
 Lot-size= Average lot-size in million pounds.   
 Office, Retail, Industrial, Other-subtype: “1’ for fund focusing on the category, all “0” if it is 
a balanced fund. 
 
 10 yrs’ performance, 25 samples 
 Coefficients t Stat 
Intercept 3.621435 1.519912 
LR 6.522742 3.552593 
PCR 0.516459 0.072704 
HHI 0.001023 1.758003 
Lot-size -0.03053 -0.68894 
Office -3.9847 -0.90225 
Retail -4.91274 -1.20232 
Industry -5.40328 -1.45421 
Other-subtype 0 0 
R square 0.877595  
Adjusted R Square 0.827193  
 
 7 yrs’ performance, 33 samples 
 Coefficients t Stat 
Intercept 12.17389 4.713322 
LR 6.266543 4.234533 
PCR -10.0202 -1.12336 
HHI -0.00081 -1.07609 
Lot-size 0.050498 1.372422 
Office 11.53783 2.166832 
Retail 8.786336 1.661488 
Industry 6.549478 1.340609 
Other-subtype 11.80696 1.906518 
R square 0.864772  
Adjusted R Square 0.819696  
 
From the results of two scenarios of Regression 2, we see that LR still exhibits a strong positive 
correlation with risk. However, none of the other factors have consistent results. Under the two 
scenarios, when PCR and HHI have positive coefficients, the other variables have negative ones, 
and vice versa.  
33 
Actually, HHI and the four dummy variables all indicate the information about property subtype, 
so we believe part of the reason for the non-significant result lies on the conceptual overlapping 
of these factors. If we diminish the dummy variables and use the following formula: 
σ = a + b1×LR + b2×PCR + b3×HHI + b4×Lot-size,                                    (Regression 3) 
then the results are: 
 10 yrs’ performance, 25 samples 
 Coefficients t Stat 
Intercept 5.753884 3.261339 
LR 6.346254 3.500875 
PCR -0.42658 -0.06329 
HHI 0.000297 2.323892 
Lot-size -0.01901 -0.43304 
R square 0.85453  
Adjusted R Square 0.825437  
 
 7 yrs’ performance, 33 samples 
 Coefficients t Stat 
Intercept 8.998964 5.486443 
LR 4.962613 3.856906 
PCR -1.60447 -0.19999 
HHI 0.000393 2.035401 
Lot-size 0.068399 2.181522 
R square 0.826801  
Adjusted R Square 0.802058  
 
Under both scenarios, LR and HHI have statistically significant results. Clearly, a lower HHI 
(which means involving more subtypes) will reduce a fund’s risk, by a rate of about 1.2(%) per 
standard deviation of HHI. PCR shows a weakly negative relation with volatility. Lot-size shows 
a positive relation with volatility, and it has a statistically significant result from the regression of 
the second scenario.  
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With knowledge of the dominant impact of LR in any regression we conduct here, I decide to 
construct a fourth regression without LR on the right side of the equation based on the data about 
non-leveraged funds. Again, dummy variables are not utilized, so the new equation is: 
σ = a + b1×PCR + b2× HHI + b3×Lot-size,                                          (Regression 4) 
and the regression result is: 
 
 10 yrs performance, 10 samples 
 Coefficients t Stat 
Intercept 11.13676 23.33384 
PCR -16.803 -3.04504 
HHI 0.000676 5.073193 
Lot-size 0.050525 1.412925 
R Square 0.843968  
Adjusted R Square 0.765953  
 
From the result above, we see that PCR is negatively and HHI is positively related to the 
volatility (both coefficients are significant). The result of HHI shows that when HHI rises by its 
standard deviation27 , the volatility increases by about 1.92(%). Lot-size has a positive relation 
with the volatility, but it fails to have a significant result.  
Both HHI and Lot-size have consistent results through the four regressions, and their coefficients 
are match our understanding about their roles. However, the result we have for PCR is 
surprising. A negative coefficient for PCR means that the more properties a fund has (the lower 
                                                 
27 The standard deviation of HHI for the 10 samples is 2845. 
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PCR is), the more volatile it tends to be. By definition this relation is not true. Based on the 
regression of volatility solely on PCR, it is not true either28. The surprising result occurs mainly 
because of shadow impacts from other factors and also due to the limited amount of samples. 
Further research will provide better results.  
In the fourth regression, HHI again shows a positive relationship with the volatility. Lot-size has 
a weakly positive coefficient.  
From the regressions above, we can conclude: 
 The use of leverage is by far the dominant factor. (LR) 
 The more subtype-diversified a fund is, the less volatile it is, and the relationship is 
relatively strong. (HHI) 
 The larger the average lot-size is, the more volatile a fund tends to be, but the 
relationship is not strong.  (Lot-size) 
 The relationship between property count and volatility is not clear from the regressions. 
(PCR) 
   
 
                                                 
28 We get a statistically significant coefficient of 30.5 for PCR, from the regression of: σ = a + b1×PCR, using data 
for the past 10 years. 
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Chapter 3:  Classification Process 
3.1 The LTV-dominated classification 
Nearly half of the 17 attributes NCREIF and Ron Kaiser listed are available in the IPD fund data 
set, but there is very limited explanation about how to apply these factors quantitatively. Based 
on analysis in Chapter 2, we choose Loan-to-value (LTV) ratio as the dominant factor in the 
classification of styles for two reasons: it has a strong influence on the expected risk/return and 
the dispersion of LTV has a natural gap between 40%-50%. 
• LTV has the strongest influence to the expected risk and return 
Based on the analysis in Section 2.3, LTV undoubtedly has the biggest impact on a fund’s risk. 
Additionally, we can make a rough calculation about the range of possible returns for different 
approaches based on certain assumptions in Table 3-1.  
Table 3-1 Major factors’ influences on expected return 
 Range of factor Range of return  Assumption 
Core approach - 10%  
Using Debts LTV: 0 – 80% 10%-44% 7% interest rate 
Doing developments  Exposure: 0 – 30% 10%-14.5% Return of 25% for development  
Holding other subtypes  Exposure: 0%-100% 10%-15% Return of 15% for other subtypes 
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• The natural gap 
Ranging from 0% to 80.2%, the values of LTV show a natural gap between 40%-50%. The 
equal-weighted average for leverage ratio of funds above the gap is 65%, similar to that of the 
US opportunistic funds, 67.4%. 
Meanwhile, there are 17 funds with zero LTV ratios, possibly because of their own regulations. 
These funds are the most risk-averse, and they amount to about one third of all funds, so 
preliminarily, they can be defined as core funds.  
Core funds in the US have an average LTV of 30.7%, by the end of the first quarter of 2009. 
Actually, it is rare to see property funds with no loans in the US29. The critical difference in LTV 
between the US core funds and the UK core funds seems to be a deficit of the classification, but 
basically it is inevitable.  
Table 3-2 Result of the preliminary classification 
Core  Value-Added  Opportunistic   
 All 
Core 
Open-ended  
Core 
All  
Value-add 
Open-end
Value-add 
Closed-end
Value-add 
All  
Opportunistic 
Closed-end 
Opportunistic 
NAV ((£m) 5779.2 5082.03 10905.02 5712.72 5192.31 3877.35 3361.15 
LTV 0.0% 0.0% 15.6% 15.0% 16.3% 64.1% 64.7% 
Manager Count 14 13 18 14 6 17 13 
Fund Count 17 15 24 15 9 21 17 
 
                                                 
29 This phenomenon illustrates the appetite for unlevered returns in the UK, possibly because some unit trusts are tax 
transparent so leverage is less beneficial to them, and/or the investors simply prefer to make their own leverage at 
home. 
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Table 3-2 shows the result of the preliminary classification. There are 17 “core” funds with zero 
leverage ratio, 24 “value-added” funds with 0-40% leverage ratio (mean of 15.6%) and 21 
“opportunistic” funds with more than 50% leverage ratio (mean of 64.7%). As we can see in 
Figure 3-1, this classification has a good match with the observation of the funds’ historical 
volatility. 
Figure 3-1 Preliminary classification: LTV, Volatility 
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3.2 Dispersion of other factors among the three style boxes 
After the LTV-dominated classification, the dispersion of other factors among the three boxes 
deserves attention. Any abnormal trends or extreme outliers found may provide clues for 
adjustment to the classification. At the same time, I calculate the correlation and ranking 
correlation between each factor and LTV.    
•  Financial factors -NAV, GAV, Property Count and Cash holding ratio 
The NAV has a negative correlation with LTV, meaning that funds seeking higher risks and high 
returns tend to be smaller. As Figure 3.2 shows, funds with higher than £ 1Bn NAV fall into core 
and value-added boxes only. The Gross Asset Value (GAV), which includes debt, shows a 
weakly positive correlation with LTV. This result is different from what we get from the US 
funds (Table 2-1). In the US, core funds have by far the largest average size than the others, but 
in the UK, fund sizes of three styles are closer to each other. No obvious outlier is found for UK 
funds here.  
Another size factor, the Property Count (GAV/average lot-size) shows a relatively strong 
negative correlation with LTV, indicating that the diversification among properties is important 
to investors. The first outlier, Fund 42, has about 270 different properties. We also notice that it 
has about 5% cash holding, which lowers its real LTV ratio. However, we prefer not to move 
Fund 42 to the value-added box because it is a specialist fund investing 100% in healthcare 
properties. According to analysis in Section 2.3, subtype diversification has the second biggest 
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influence on a fund’s volatility. Another outlier, Fund 53, has more than 390 properties, the most 
among all funds. It can’t be easily removed from the opportunistic box either, because its LTV is 
too high.  
Cash holding percentage (Cash/GAV×100%) shows a relatively strong negative correlation with 
LTV. No obvious outlier is found. However, among the value-added funds, Funds 20 and 19 
have more cash than their debts. So these two funds have zero Net Debt. We should consider 
moving these two funds from the value-added category to the core.  
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Table 3-3 NAV and LTV 
Available samples 62  Mean of Co/Va/Op 340.0  / 454.4   /184.6 
Correlation -0.313 Outliers  
Pearson ranking correlation -0.299   
 
Figure 3-2 NAV and LTV 
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Table 3-4 GAV and LTV 
Available samples 60 Mean of Co/Va/Op 424.3   / 672.7   /682.3 
Correlation 0.133 Outliers  
Pearson ranking correlation 0.193   
 
Figure 3-3 GAV and LTV 
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Table 3-5 Property Count and LTV 
Available samples 54  Mean of Co/Va/Op 69.2 / 39.2/ 56.7 
Correlation -0.029 Outliers Fund 42, 53 
Pearson ranking correlation -0.317   
 
Figure 3-4 Property Count and LTV 
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Table 3-6 Cash holding ratio and LTV 
Available samples 62 Mean of Co/Va/Op 8.8%/   3.9% / 1.8% 
Correlation -0.337 Outliers Fund 20 
Pearson ranking correlation -0.425   
 
Figure 3-5 Cash holding ratio and LTV 
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• Property factors –Average Lot-size, Subtype Distribution and Property Concentration  
The dispersion of average lot-size seems to support the findings of study by Ziering and 
McIntosh (1999). The average lot-size tends to be higher when a fund is less risk-averse (with 
higher LTV) and the correlation is relatively high. The most obvious outlier is Fund 19, a 
specialist fund investing in shopping centers, but the extremely high lot-size is still not enough to 
make it an opportunistic fund, given its low LTV. However, it makes me believe that Fund 19 
should stay in the value-added box, although its Net debt is zero. 
The concentration on the top ten investments measures how diversified a portfolio is among 
different properties (in a way other than PCR). Those with higher exposure to their ten largest 
properties tend to be less diversified. This factor has a weak positive correlation with the LTV 
ratio. It generates two outliers, Funds 42 and 53, the same as the property count observation 
does. 
Figure 3-8 shows how much the funds are investing in three major subtypes (Office, Retail and 
Industrial). Although the ranking correlation between the two factors is low, we still notice that 
subtypes besides the three major ones are considered opportunistic. At the same time, Figure 3-9 
shows that specialist funds obviously tend to be using more debt while most balanced funds have 
lower LTV. This supports the findings about HHI’s strong correlation with the expected 
volatility in Section 2.3. 
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Table 3-7 Average lot-size and LTV 
Available samples 54  Mean of Co/Va/Op 7.4/ 29.2/ 36.1 
Correlation 0.283 Outliers Fund 19 
Pearson ranking correlation 0.288   
 
Figure 3-6 Average lot-size and LTV 
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Table 3-8 Concentration on the 10 largest investments and LTV 
Available samples 56  Mean of Co/Va/Op 51.8/ 64.0/ 68.0 
Correlation 0.239 Outliers Fund 42  
Pearson ranking correlation 0.265   
 
Figure 3-7 Concentration on the 10 largest investments and LTV 
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Table 3-9 Concentration on three subtypes and LTV 
Available samples 62 Mean of Co/Va/Op 92.5%/   95.1% / 75.5% 
Correlation -0.235 Outliers Fund 14 
Pearson ranking correlation 0.069   
 
Figure 3-8 Concentration on three subtypes and LTV 
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Figure 3-9 Distribution in Subtypes 
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•  Term structure, Age and Development exposure 
Most core funds are open-ended while most opportunistic funds are closed-ended. This is the 
same phenomenon as the US funds exhibit.  
Figure 3.11, showing ages of the 62 funds30, tells us that most highly-levered UK funds were 
founded after year 2003, the end of last downturn of the real estate market. The past eight years 
is also a highly productive period for funds with zero or little debts. However, the time during 
1996-2000 is a relatively void period with very few funds founded. 
Although the real exposure to development for any fund here is unavailable, I still try to get a 
hint from the funds’ restrictions (this information is still absent for some funds) on the exposure. 
However, no obvious trend is found. Fund 35 is an outlier, but without enough data about its real 
exposure to development, any adjustment will be bold.  
 
                                                 
30 More precisely, it shows how many years’ performance is available for each fund in the UK-fund data set.  
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 Figure 3-10 Term Structure and LTV 
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Figure 3-11 Fund Age and LTV 
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Figure 3-12 Max. Exposure to Development and LTV 
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3.3 Adjusted classification 
After the observations in Section 3.2, two adjustments have to be made to the preliminary 
classification. Fund 20 has to be moved from the value-added box to the core box, because: 1) it 
has zero Net debt, 2) it is a balanced fund and 3) its volatility is lower than those of other value-
added funds (Figure 3.1). Another fund that was treated “unfairly”, I believe, is Fund 18 in the 
value-added box. Its LTV ratio is 0.3%, which is not distinguishable with zero, and it is a 
balanced fund pursuing diversification among the major three subtypes. It should also be moved 
to the core style-box 
Thus we redefine fund 20 and fund 18 as core funds instead of value-added funds. The other 
60 funds will remain as what they were. After the adjusted classification, there are 19 core funds, 
22 value-added funds and 21 opportunistic funds.  
Table 3-10 Result of the adjusted classification 
Core  Value-Added  Opportunistic   
 All  
Core 
Open-ended  
Core 
All  
Value-add 
Open-end
Value-add 
Closed-end
Value-add 
All  
Opportunistic 
Closed-end 
Opportunistic 
NAV (£m) 6543.4 5846.3 10140.8 4948.5 5192.3 3877.3 3361.2 
LTV 0.3% 0.3% 16.2% 15.9% 16.3% 64.1% 64.7% 
Manager Count 16 15 16 12 6 17 13 
Fund Count 19 16 22 13 9 21 17 
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Chapter 4:  Style-comparison between UK and US Funds  
4.1 Market share and size 
Figure 4-1 Basic composition of UK and US funds  
US funds                                                       UK funds 
0%
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80%
90%
100%
NAV GAV FUND COUNT NAV GAV FUND COUNT
Core Value‐open Value‐closed Opportunity  
 
After making the US-three style-classification to UK funds, some immediate style-comparison 
between the two countries’ funds seems necessary. A few significant differences appear in basic 
attributes such as fund size and market share. The first difference is the market shares of core and 
value-added. In the US, value-added funds represent much larger a portion (44%) than they do in 
the UK (31%) in terms of NAV. In terms of GAV the contrast is similar (25% compared to 
20%). At the same time, value-added in the US represents a much smaller proportion than it does 
in the UK. This creates some inconveniency for researchers to compare fund styles between the 
two countries. If we introduce the fourth style, core-plus, the inconveniency would be mitigated. 
The core-plus funds are majorly hidden in the core category in the US and value-added in the 
UK, as is shown by the dot lines in Figure 4-1. If the dot-line areas in the figure are defined as 
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core-plus, core, core-plus and value-added will have much more similar market shares in both 
countries.   
The second difference is the between the market shares of opportunistic funds. In the US 
opportunistic funds represent a much larger proportion (56% of total GAV) than they do in the 
UK (35% of total GAV). One possible reason is the extra appetite of US investors for 
international investments. In the US over 40% opportunistic capital is allocated in markets other 
than the North America. The internationally-oriented capital all add to the opportunistic funds, 
making opportunistic the largest style in the US in terms of GAV. However, all the 62 UK funds 
in our data set invest domestically.  
Third, there is a significant contrast between the average sizes of UK and US core funds. The 
average size for US core funds is much larger than that of any other groups. Most US core funds 
are open-ended, and they have been active for a long time, making it possible for them to grow 
into very large sizes.  
4.2 LTV 
The difference in LTV between the UK and US funds is significant. While the average LTV for 
US core funds is about 30%, most UK core funds have zero LTV. Similarly, LTV of value-added 
in the UK (18%) is much lower than it is in the US (50%). As mentioned before, there is a great 
demand for un-geared real estate return in the UK. Some investors prefer to use gearing by 
themselves. And since some unit trusts are tax transparent, they are less inclined to use leverage.  
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Figure 4-2 Average sizes of the UK and the US funds31 
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Figure 4-3 LTV ratio comparison 
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31 Calculated using the currency rate of: 1 British pound=1.641US dollars 
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4.3 Performance 
Figures 4-4, 4-5 and 4-6 show a series of performance comparisons between UK and US funds. 
During year 2006-2007, the US opportunistic funds delivered excellent returns, which could not 
be explained by their LTV. As is shown in Figure 4-3, the US and UK opportunistic funds have 
similar LTV, while the average LTV is much lower in the UK. If LTV is the dominant factor for 
expected risk/return, we should see extremely high peak in the opportunistic category in the UK, 
not in the US.  
What can explain the performance of US opportunistic funds? And what is the reason for the 
performance of UK opportunistic funds? The first reason possibly lies in the flaw of data used 
here: 1) the UK funds’ LTV might vary in the history but I am only using the current data 
(1Q/2009) and 2) there is only one sample for UK opportunistic funds (all the other UK 
opportunistic funds have ages smaller than 10 years). The second reason might be the profit from 
overseas markets. The US opportunistic funds have nearly half investments in markets other than 
North America. However, further studies will give better explanations. 
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Figure 4-4 Comparison of UK and US “style indices”32 
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Figure 4-5 Comparison of market peaks in the UK and the US 
             The height of the peak, 1998=100%                          The loss from the peak to Dec. 2008 
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32 Each index is created using annual equal-weighted return, due to the limited data.  
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Figure 4-6 Comparison of annualized return for UK and US funds (up to 1Q/2009) 
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Appendix A:   UK-Funds Report, Q1/09 
The following tables and figures are generated based on the data provided by IPD about 62 funds in the UK. 
Time-Weighted Index Returns 
Core Value-Added Opportunistic 
  
Returns 
(Equal Weight) 
All core Open-end All  value-add Open-end Closed-end All Opportunistic Closed-end
Total return -7.99% -5.5% -9.3% -9.7% -8.7% -22.8% -24.7%
 Q
tr prior qtr. total return -10.5% -10.4% -16.3% -14.6% -18.7% -27.0% -27.7%
Current year -21.1% -20.7% -32.2% -31.2% -33.7% -51.8% -54.2%
 prior year -7.2% -7.5% -10.1% -11.1% -8.6% -14.5% -15.1%
2008 -18.2% -18.0% -28.4% -27.1% -30.5% -42.0% -43.7%
2007 -3.4% -3.7% -3.3% -5.1% -0.6% -5.8% -6.2%
2006 16.2% 16.5% 24.6% 20.1% 31.1% 25.7% 27.2%
2005 17.0% 17.0% 19.3% 19.4% 19.0% 26.8% 28.0%
ca
le
nd
ar
 y
ea
r 
2004 17.4% 17.5% 19.6% 19.3% 20.5% 27.0% 26.1%
3 year -6.6% -6.6% -10.0% -10.6% -9.2% -23.4% -24.1%
5 year 2.4% 2.4% 1.8% 1.0% 3.8% -9.3% -9.7%
5 yr Stdev 18.5% 18.4% 24.9% 23.3% 26.6% 34.8% 34.6%
5 yr Sharpe ratio -0.0418 -0.0429 -0.0449 -0.0764 0.0291 -0.3541 -0.3666
7 yr 5.1% 5.1% 3.7% 4.0% 2.7% 0.5% 0.7%
A
nn
ua
liz
ed
 
10 yr 6.9% 6.9% 6.0% 5.8% 7.3% -1.94% -1.94%
 
Balance Sheet and Other Information (£m) 
Core  Value-Added  Opportunistic   
 All core Open-end All value-add Open-end Closed-end All Opportunistic Closed-end 
NAV(Q1/09) 6543.4 5846.3 10140.8 4948.5 5192.3 3877.3 3361.2 
Cash % (NAV)  5.9% 6.7% 4.2% 3.3% 5.1% 10.2% 9.9% 
LTV (Q109) 0.4% 0.4% 16.2% 15.9% 16.3% 64.1% 64.7% 
Managers 16 15 16 12 6 17 13 
Funds 19 16 22 13 9 21 17 
 
Total Return, Gross- Annualized 5 year 
          Core                               Value‐added                             Opportunistic 
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Fund Indices – Attributes (Q1/2009) 
 
                                         Net Assets                                                                  Gross Real Estate  
                                        £20561.6M                                                                       £29493.3M  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                         Leverage                                                               Regional Diversification      
                                                                                                                              (All in the UK) 
 
 
 
                                                                                                  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                         Fund Count                                                                     Manager Count  
                                               62                         
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 Appendix B:    US-Funds Report, Q1/09 
The following tables and figures are selected from the Real Estate Fund Indices and Vintage Period Performance Report, 
First Quarter 2009 by NCREIF and the Townsend Group.  
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Fund Indices- Attributes.     March 31, 2009 
 
 
60 
Appendix C:   The Attribute List of 62 UK Funds 
 
These attributes are provided or calculated using the data set provided by Investment Property Databank (IPD). 
 
Fund 
NO. Style 
LTV 
(%) 
Q1/09 
NAV 
(£m) 
Q1/09 
GAV 
(£m) 
Q3/08 
NAV 
(£m) 
Q3/08 
Age 
(yr) 
Spclst 
1=yes 
Closed 
1=yes 
Direct 
hold 
(%) 
Prpty 
Count 
Ave. 
Lot-
size 
(£m) 
Cash 
hold 
(%) 
<5 yrs 
lease 
(%) 
Top 10 
tenants 
(%) 
Top 10 
invtmts 
(%) 
3 types 
(%) HHI  
Max. 
Cash 
(%) 
62  Opntc  80.2  125.1  923.7  393.9  6  1  1  100  15.0  61.6  15.1  21.5  49.7  88.5  100.0  9485   
61  Opntc  79.7  124.4  825.2  316.5  5  1  1  97  18.6  44.3  14.6  6.5  44.7  74.9  0.0  9195  * 
60  Opntc  78.4  344.0  2181.5  1050.6  6  1  1  100  20.0  109.1  372.9  32.3  23.0  66.2  100.0  8165  * 
59  Opntc  73.9  43.9  211.0  88.0  7  0  1  100  25.1  8.4  6.3  28.2  47.3  66.2  87.8  3262  * 
58  Opntc  73.4  80.3      6  1                  100.0  10000   
57  Opntc  72.6  111.9  613.0  312.5  11  1  1  100  5.0  122.6  3.7  31.9  23.1  100.0  100.0  10000  * 
56  Opntc  68.6  40.0  203.0  86.0  7  1  1  80  27.4  7.4  43.0  64.0  37.8  60.0  97.8  5571  * 
55  Opntc  65.2  24.6  91.4  42.4  4  0  0  100  31.5  2.9  3.9  67.6  53.2  57.4  99.4  4187  * 
54  Opntc  63.3  108.7  367.4  167.6  4  1  1  100  20.0  18.4  19.7  55.9  56.3  63.7  100.0  8425  * 
53  Opntc  63.1  261.3  981.4  479.8  6  1  1  93  392.6  2.5  6.6  77.8  12.8  19.4  100.0  9667  * 
52  Opntc  61.9  112.3  386.0  194.0  7  1  0  100  101.6  3.8  11.8  80.3  8.8  45.5  100.0  10000  * 
51  Opntc  59.3  360.4  1090.0  605.0  8  1  1  100  20.0  54.5  70.9  9.0  51.3  72.6  100.0  9866  25.0 
50  Opntc  58.2  61.5  160.4  91.8  3  1  1  100  12.0  13.4  0.4  62.9    93.9  0.0  10000  * 
49  Opntc  58.0  348.6  768.5  442.1  2  1  0  100  40.0  19.2  88.6  99.0    51.7  0.0  9415  * 
48  Opntc  56.7  108.8  340.3  172.9  2  1  1  100      11.3  11.7  88.3  81.5  100.0  9428  * 
47  Opntc  56.2  162.1  462.7  285.9  4  1  1  97  19.6  23.6  0.0  20.6  72.5  77.5  100.0  10000  20.0 
46  Opntc  55.8  30.7  84.4  50.2  4  0  0  100  21.1  4.0  4.5  28.5  52.9  59.8  100.0  4419  * 
45  Opntc  54.4  753.7  2333.0  1314.0  8  1  1  78  27.1  86.1  1.8  12.4  41.7  66.5  100.0  10000  * 
44  Opntc  51.9  195.9  535.3  323.8  5  1  1  100  8.0  66.9  0.2    45.2  100.0  100.0  10000  * 
43  Opntc  51.6  91.9  235.0  135.0  7  1  1  100  7.0  33.6  0.6  1.8  75.9  100.0  0.0  10000  * 
42  Opntc  50.5  387.1  853.0  482.0  4  1  1  100  266.6  3.2  33.6  0.0  54.9  14.8  0.0  9128  * 
41  Val‐ad  38.5  223.2  450.3  314.2  9  1  1  100  5.0  90.1  9.4  25.7  *  100.0  100.0  10000  * 
40  Val‐ad  38.4  295.9  603.3  441.9  8  1  1  88  8.0  75.7  30.3  28.2  65.6  90.0  100.0  7652  * 
39  Val‐ad  33.1  187.4  345.1  282.7  5  1  1  100  11.0  31.4  32.3  33.1  68.2  98.7  100.0  7912   
38  Val‐ad  30.3  471.1  860.0  650.0  11  1  1  100  110.3  7.8  0.0  63.8  14.4  26.7  100.0  10000  * 
37  Val‐ad  25.7  24.8  38.0  33.1  5  0  0  100  9.0  4.2  4.1  66.8  43.3  100.0  100.0  2934  * 
36  Val‐ad  24.6  397.1  705.0  571.0  11  0  0  94  54.2  13.0  10.8  43.4  25.4  44.1  80.9  2688  40.0 
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Fund 
NO. Style 
LTV 
(%) 
Q1/09 
NAV 
(£m) 
Q1/09 
GAV 
(£m) 
Q3/08 
NAV 
(£m) 
Q3/08 
Age 
(yr) 
Spclst 
1=yes 
Closed 
1=yes 
Direct 
hold 
(%) 
Prpty 
Count 
Ave. 
Lot-
size 
(£m) 
Cash 
hold 
(%) 
<5 yrs 
lease 
(%) 
Top 10 
tenants 
(%) 
Top 10 
invtmts 
(%) 
3 types 
(%) HHI  
Max. 
Cash 
(%) 
35  Val‐ad  21.8  86.1  145.7  110.6  14  1  0  100  39.4  3.7  1.0  46.8  30.4  51.4  100.0  9966  10.0 
34  Val‐ad  20.7  1339.7  2041.1  1764.0  19  0  0  86  85.8  23.8  91.9  28.3  34.5  50.7  75.2  2414  10.0 
33  Val‐ad  20.7  312.8  550.0  447.0  19  0  0  67  55.0  10.0  0.4  56.8  19.7  40.8  80.7  2546  7.5 
32  Val‐ad  20.0  472.7  770.9  667.0  5  1  1  0      0.2  11.9  23.5    100.0  9998  0.0 
31  Val‐ad  17.3  1022.5  1508.7  1326.1  19  0  0  48  73.2  20.6  6.0  53.9  29.7  27.2  89.5  2856  * 
30  Val‐ad  16.7  137.3  209.1  197.8  15  0  0  81  36.1  5.8  2.9  36.3  50.4  47.0  77.2  2514  * 
29  Val‐ad  13.8  69.3  122.0  101.0  19  0  0  100  20.0  6.1  0.0  56.3  52.0  72.0  100.0  3532  * 
28  Val‐ad  12.0  48.6  88.1  68.6  4  0  0  100  21.0  4.2  0.0  50.9  53.8  78.4  88.9  2795  * 
27  Val‐ad  10.7  1283.0  1826.6  1841.1  15  0  1  93  99.8  18.3  92.2  26.2  26.4  36.9  97.7  3054  * 
26  Val‐ad  8.9  219.4  312.9  293.6  18  1  0  87  13.7  22.8  4.8  19.8  26.9  85.4  100.0  9639  * 
25  Val‐ad  8.1  249.5  363.7  337.5  18  1  0  100  26.9  13.5  4.6  56.0  53.9    100.0  9793  * 
24  Val‐ad  8.0  495.6  677.0  629.0  19  0  0  82  45.4  14.9  11.4  20.4  39.5  46.3  97.1  3543  10.0 
23  Val‐ad  7.7  460.7  608.0  714.0  5  1  1  100  18.0  33.8  126.8  41.7  47.5  84.2  100.0  9312  * 
22  Val‐ad  6.7  584.1  810.6  786.7  4  1  1  81  11.2  72.5  13.8  8.6  51.7  80.5  100.0  9438  * 
21  Val‐ad  6.6  545.7  718.0  696.0  14  0  0  95  54.0  13.3  9.8  37.1  24.1  48.4  100.0  3355  * 
20  Core  6.4  391.1  397.0  465.0  19  0  0  85  57.5  6.9  102.3  34.6  39.9  40.1  96.1  1622  25.0 
19  Val‐ad  2.7  1214.3  1510.2  1546.2  4  1  1  100  9.0  167.8  63.8  29.4  23.1  100.0  100.0  8949  * 
18  Core  0.3  373.1  483.5  480.2  9  0  0  92  39.0  12.4  0.0  21.7  34.4  58.5  98.9  3494  * 
17  Core  0.0  105.9      2  0                  100.0  3318   
16  Core  0.0  293.8  295.6  330.5  17  0  0  100  95.4  3.1  36.0  56.2  23.0  25.7  99.0  2768  * 
15  Core  0.0  497.7  560.5  644.6  16  0  0  92  133.5  4.2  83.6  63.7  16.8  27.3  99.2  2435  * 
14  Core  0.0  59.9  72.0  72.6  9  1  0  100      0.8  100.0    71.2  0.0  9588  * 
13  Core  0.0  462.4  558.0  569.0  19  0  0  100  90.0  6.2  16.4  46.2  29.9  33.7  95.4  2330  20.0 
12  Core  0.0  565.8  707.0  709.0  6  1  1  37      0.0  22.3  26.9    100.0  10000  * 
11  Core  0.0  131.3  164.0  164.2  7  1  1  100      0.0  16.5  36.8  100.0  100.0  10000  * 
10  Core  0.0  197.7  250.2  260.3  8  0  0  99  38.5  6.5  10.1  30.6  37.0  49.4  100.0  3268  * 
9  Core  0.0  1563.8  1967.5  2030.6  19  0  0  88  96.9  20.3  54.7  10.2  17.8  35.9  97.4  3329  * 
8  Core  0.0  74.0  94.3  97.1  10  1  0  100  16.0  5.9  3.1  42.5  29.8  83.5  100.0  8876  * 
7  Core  0.0  177.6  199.0  218.6  18  1  0  100  12.0  16.6  1.7  39.2  51.3  93.2  100.0  8804  * 
6  Core  0.0  157.1  173.0  192.0  10  0  0  100  42.2  4.1  19.0  44.1  43.7  53.3  96.8  2735   
5  Core  0.0  58.4  44.4  67.8  19  0  0  1      10.2        97.3  1538  34.5 
4  Core  0.0  131.4  185.3  204.9  19  1  0  100  59.8  3.1  18.3  59.9  16.4  33.8  100.0  7860  * 
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Fund 
NO. Style 
LTV 
(%) 
Q1/09 
NAV 
(£m) 
Q1/09 
GAV 
(£m) 
Q3/08 
NAV 
(£m) 
Q3/08 
Age 
(yr) 
Spclst 
1=yes 
Closed 
1=yes 
Direct 
hold 
(%) 
Prpty 
Count 
Ave. 
Lot-
size 
(£m) 
Cash 
hold 
(%) 
<5 yrs 
lease 
(%) 
Top 10 
tenants 
(%) 
Top 10 
invtmts 
(%) 
3 types 
(%) HHI  
Max. 
Cash 
(%) 
3  Core  0.0  86.8  115.4  118.0  7  0  0  100  28.1  4.1  2.7  56.8  42.3  59.2  100.0  3525  20.0 
2  Core  0.0  558.3  628.6  749.2  19  0  0  94  146.2  4.3  111.0  21.0  31.9  28.0  91.2  2278  * 
1  Core  0.0  657.2  774.6  834.3  16  0  0  100  71.7  10.8  59.7  32.5  23.1  31.2  96.0  2902   
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